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„I have a long very long story to explain to you.‟                                                                                                           
Anonymous Witness, Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Hearings
2








 August 2003 in the City of Accra, Ghana, representatives of the new 
Liberian government signed what became known as the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA).
3
 The Agreement marked the formal end of over twenty years of 
civil war and strife for Liberia and the Liberian people. Article XIII of the CPA 
outlines the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Accordingly, the Commission was mandated to „provide a forum that will address 
issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of 
human rights violations to share their experiences in order to get a clear picture of 
the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.‟
4
 In essence, the proposal 
was for individuals to share their experiences, through speech and language, of the 
violence and inhumane treatment suffered through the years of war, in order to 
provide the greater community of Liberia with a clearer understanding of their 
collective history and, as a result, lead the country to realise „genuine healing and 
reconciliation‟ through this process.
5
 
 Through a philosophical and psychological framework this paper seeks to 
explore the promises and limitations of truth commissions - with specific reference 
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 Anonymous Witness, Fish Town City River County, Feb 25 2008, available at 
http://trcofliberia.org/transcripts/29, last accessed 7
th
 September 2011. 
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 Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Liberia, signed 18
th
 August 2003, Accra, Ghana. Available at 
http://trcofliberia.org/resources/documents/peace-agreement.pdf, last accessed 21
st
 August 2011.  
4
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia Mandate, enacted on May 12
th
 2005, by the 
National Transitional Legislative Assembly, available at http://trcofliberia.org/about/trc-mandate, last 
accessed 2
nd
 September 2011, p. 2.  
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 Ibid.  
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 Friedrich Nietzsche, „Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense‟, in Keith Ansall-Pearson and Duncan 
Large (eds), The Nietzsche Reader, (Blackwell Publishing: Maldon, 2006). 
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to the truth commission established in Liberia - through a deconstruction and 
discussion of their central elements: truth, testimony, history and reconciliation.  
The paper will contest the notion posited in the mandates of truth 
commissions that truth is something objective and verifiable that can be found; 
rather, I insist that if we align our understanding of truth with Nietzschean thinking 
on the subject, truth commissions can foster the creation of truth through the 




The paper then goes on to discuss some of the problems inherent in the idea 
that, through the act of narrative, individuals can heal through a spoken testament of 
their traumas. Following post-modernist thinking, this paper is sceptical of claims of 
official truth and history which privileges certain memories and narratives and in fact 
subscribes to a version of history which suits the agenda of the new order and 
government, or those who have been tasked with writing this official truth and 
history. Indeed, by the very notion that truth commissions “rewrite” the past they 
admit that truth and history are permeable, biased and privileged to whomever is 
writing it. This paper argues that despite truth commission‟s claims that they are 
therapeutic bodies aimed at the overall healing and betterment of those afflicted by 
the pains of war, truth commissions are in fact political bodies designed to forward 
the agenda of the new reigning order. In addition, this paper makes suggestions as to 
what elements of a truth commission can have a positive and healing effect, and 
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 Friedrich Nietzsche, „Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense‟, in Keith Ansall-Pearson and Duncan 
















„If the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say this or that event, it never 
happened - that, surely, was more terrifying than mere torture and death. […] 
And if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed – if all records told 
the same tale – then the lie passed into history and became truth. “Who controls 
the past” ran the Party slogan, “controls the future: who controls the present 
controls the past”.‟ 








This work will span the literature and discourses of philosophical, political, 
psychological and legal studies as it delves into the meanings and promises of the 
„truth commission‟. In modern society, as nation states fight against others and 
internally, mechanisms have been developed in the field of transitional justice which 
are aimed at bringing a country out of the darkness of war and oppression and into 
the light of democracy and human rights. Such goals reveal not just the 
contemporary trends in governance, but the ideals of a new world order. As a 
parastatal body, a truth commission stands as a prime space where the goals of this 
new world order can be performed and enacted, especially as the international 
community becomes involved in its processes. This paper will explore the 
conceptual grassroots of truth commissions and, through this, lay out the argument 
that they become a political tool used to forward the agenda of the new government.  
 
1. Truth Commissions 
 
                                                          
7















Truth commissions are temporary parastatal bodies designed to deal with the 
atrocities of a country‟s past through the hearing of individual testimonies, from both 
victims and perpetrators, and through their own investigations. In this way they aim 
to bring to light the truth of the past in order to create a nationally accepted history of 
what really happened. Truth commissions foster justice through the naming of past 
violence and violation, and foster reconciliation through the dialogic confrontation of 
victims and perpetrators and through the national process of learning truth and 
creating history. Indeed, the public testimony of individual memories of war come 
together to form a national consciousness which warns people not to let it happen 
again and brings them together over a shared history and heritage.
8
  
Truth commissions occupy an unchartered territory between the legal trial 
and court room and those unofficial spaces whereby crimes or hurtful behaviour are 
confronted and handled.
9
 Truth commissions do not hold the power to prosecute but 
employ a legalistic method of investigation and testimony-hearing.
10
 It is, as many 
have remarked, a „quasi-juridicial body‟ indicative of the victim-centred paradigm 
shift in criminal justice, as they privilege the voices of the country‟s victims.
11
 Yet, 
truth commissions do not favour the individual witness as their justice (in the form 
of prosecuting their victimiser) is sacrificed for truth and justice for all. However, 
when a country is facing a multitude of human rights violations and violations of 
humanitarian law, it would be near impossible for any country‟s judicial system to 
process so many cases; and further, these countries tend to have weak judicial and 
administrative structures as a result of the conflict.
12
 For these reasons most agree 
that a truth commission is indeed the most suitable method for dealing with a 
                                                          
8
 For a more detailed definition of a truth commission see Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 
(Routledge: New York, 2001), pp. 1 – 49.  
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Ibid.  
11
 Mark Sanders, Ambiguities of Witnessing: Law and Literature in the Time of a Truth Commission, 
(Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2007), p. 2. And furthermore, in their report the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia also used the term „quasi-juridicial body‟, see,  
Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume One Preliminary Findings and 
Determinations, 2009, available at www.trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/volume-one_layout-
1.pdf, last accessed 3
rd
 September 2011, p. 34. 
12

















 this paper seeks to analyse how far the current model of a 




Ideologically truth commissions aim high. It is often remarked how truth 
commissions create more expectations than they are ever possibly able to fulfil. This 
paper seeks to explore the promises and limitations of truth commissions through a 





2. 1 Liberia: A Brief History 
 
Liberia is unique amongst African countries. Unlike the rest of Africa, Liberia was 
never colonised as such. Instead, in the mid-19
th
 Century it became known as the 
homeland for ex-slaves returning to Africa from the Americas. However, the natives 
of Liberia were antagonised by the repatriated Americo-Liberians, as these new 
nationals imposed systems of governance and administration which disregarded the 
needs of the natives, rendering them their servants and workers. Americo-Liberian‟s 
became the country‟s elite, exploiting the natives, whom they regarded as second 
class citizens. Effectively, Liberia became colonised by the Americo-Liberians who 
saw the country as their homeland.
15
  
 This history of Liberia provides the backdrop for the identity crises which 
caused much of the country‟s historical strife. Indeed, a succession of bloody coups 
d‟état became the motif for the movement of Liberia‟s governments as the 
oppressive governance of the white American Colonization Society was overthrown 
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 See, for example, Hayner, supra note 8 at 24 – 31.  
14
 Supra note 4 at 2.  
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 In 1822 the American Colonization Society began repatriating African-Americans to Liberia. By 
1847 Liberia was established as a sovereign nation under white Americo-Liberian rule. For a detailed 















by elitist black leadership, which, in turn, was overthrown by the likes of Samuel 
Doe, and later, Charles Taylor.
16
 Although similar to many other African countries, 
Liberia became one of the worst afflicted by internal separations and antagonisms 
between communities and tribes, differences which later came to fuel one of the 
most severe, protracted and bloody civil war of the last 50 years. The country 
suffered a continuous line of autocratic, insecure and violent presidents, including 
the notorious Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor who today is facing serious allegations 
at the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity for 
his actions in Liberia and West Africa.
17
 During the years of civil war in Liberia, 
from 1979 to 2003, it is estimated that over 250, 000 people died as a result of the 





2.2 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 
 
Therefore, it was decided at the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, 
Ghana, that a truth commission would be created in order to secure peace efforts in 
Liberia.
19
 By 2006 a Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia had been 
established which was mandated to „provide a forum that will address issues of 
impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human 
rights violations to share their experiences in order to get a clear picture of the past to 
facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation‟.
20
 Indeed, the Liberian TRC was to 
„creat[e] an independent, accurate and objective record of the past and mak[e] 
recommendations reflexive of the truth to re-unify and reconcile contending groups 
and/or the peoples of Liberia‟.
21
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 See Liberian TRC Report Volume One, supra note 11 at 50.  
19
 Supra note 3 at 11.  
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 For a number of reasons I have decided to use Liberia and the Liberian TRC 
in order to assess the conceptual possibilities and limitations of truth commissions. 
Firstly, the Liberian TRC is, to date, the most recent truth commission to be 
established and its findings published. For this reason, there is yet little literature 
which has commented on its operations and findings. I wish, therefore, to begin 
scholarly dialogue on this institution so as to assess how far it has helped in bringing 
Liberia out of the misery of its past. Further, because it is the most recent truth 
commission it has utilised many of the attributes and functions of previous truth 
commissions which are seen to be the most affective for the realisation of peace and 
justice. Therefore, to analyse the Liberian truth commission is, to some extent, to 
analyse truth commissions in general. Lastly, in their bid to establish an effective 
truth commission, the Liberian TRC drew heavily from the ideologies and 
technologies of the South African Truth and Reconciliation (SATRC).
22
 The SATRC 
has been one of the most popular and widely witnessed of truth commissions, and so 
has received much scholarly attention. Indeed, I have taken widely from the 
literature on the SATRC in order to bolster the arguments laid out here in this paper.  
 
3. Chapter Overview 
 
3.1 Chapter 1: Truth 
 
The central theme of truth commissions is, necessarily, the search for truth. This 
truth is sought in the testimonies and accounts of war and violence given by all who 
were affected, and in the investigative mandate of the commission. It is supposed 
that through the search for truth in the memories of the victims, survivors and 
perpetrators of war, that a shared national history is arrived at and reconciliation is 
achieved. However, this is idealistic and based on numerous assumptions which will 
be discussed and deconstructed in this chapter. Indeed, I outline that truth 
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 Indeed the commissioners and staff were even trained in South Africa by the commissioners and 















commissions tend to hold an understanding of truth as that which is factual, 
verifiable and corroborative: an objective reality to be uncovered, sought, and found. 
However, by bringing in Nietzschean criticisms of objective truth being created 
through language,
23
 this chapter posits that truth commissions are a discursive act 
which subjectivises individuals to the ideals of the new political regime through the 
creation, and appropriation of, truth-claiming discourses. However, on the other hand 
this chapter argues that through this notion of creating truth, truth commissions hold 
the promise of fostering the creation of subjective truths which are created through 
the engagement with speech and language as individuals narrate and testify about 
their experiences of war. And further, the subjective truths embedded in these 
narratives call upon their audience and readers to actively engage in an ethical 
reading of them and, in this way, encourage „true healing and reconciliation‟
24
 as the 
self and the other begin a process of communal empathy.    
 
3.2 Chapter 2: Testimony 
 
The second chapter will explore the notion of testimony. The stories of the 
individuals who come to testify are an integral part of a truth commission as these 
testimonies are to aid the commission in their investigation of the past, bring justice 
to the victims of war through the naming of their violations and violators, and restore 
dignity and healing to the individual through the act of narration, speech and 
revelation. The testimonies of many at truth commissions are the telling of a 
traumatic experience. Therefore, this chapter is situated within psychological debates 
on trauma and memory, and phenomenological theories on the dilemma of sharing 
experience, and argues that traumatic memories – which truth commissions hope to 
extrapolate from the testimonies of witnesses and victims – in their very nature resist 
telling, as the traumatic experience is essentially unknowable to its victim; resist 
hearing, as those witnessing often do not register the trauma as it falls outside of 
their cultural references and understanding; and resist history, as a traumatic event is 
outside of time, living repressed in a continual present.  
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The phenomenon of the truth commission continues to impress academics, 
activists and other actors in the sphere of transitional justice. Unlike the purely legal 
criminal trial, a truth commission has come to be known as a way of dealing with the 
crimes of war in a way that brings about not just justice for its victims, but healing 
and reconciliation on a national level. It is phenomenal that a mechanism of 
transitional justice has possibly been found which can bring about lasting and 
effective peace, and thus it requires deep and critical analysis. This paper will 
explore the theoretical components of a truth commission, delving into the 
limitations, and indeed possibilities, of what is now thought of as a true road to peace 
and stability for countries and nations coming out of severe war, conflict and 
difficulties. Although one of the world‟s most recent truth commissions will be 
discussed here (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia), the focus of 
this paper will primarily be a philosophical analysis of the conceptual elements 




































„I have made up thousands of stories; I have filled innumerable notebooks with 
phrases to be used when I have found the true story, the one story to which all 
these phrases refer. But I have never yet found that story. And so I begin to ask, 
are there stories?‟ 












The Ministry of Truth in George Orwell‟s Nineteen Eighty-Four was the state 
department responsible for manufacturing truths and historical facts which became 
dogmatic narratives for its citizens to follow.
26
 This literary trope was used by 
Orwell to satirically critique political narratives of freedom and democracy that 
masqueraded as truth and knowledge. With their Orwellian title, today‟s truth 
commissions are arguably not so far removed from their literary counter-part. Truth 
commissions are state sponsored operations, designed to discover truth and 
knowledge that will come to stand as a country‟s official story. And further, truth 
commissions subscribe to a political agenda in their intent to solidify confidence and 
trust from the people in the new government.
27
 However, as their designation lays 
bare, truth commissions are focused primarily towards “truth”, and this chapter 
intends to explore the meanings, consequences, and possibilities of such an 
objective. This chapter aims to analyse such questions as how does one tell the truth, 
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 Virginia Woolf, The Waves, (Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Classics: 2000), p. 106.  
26
 Supra note 7.  
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 For a critique of the political nature of truth commissions see, for example, Alex Boraine, A 
Country Unmasked, (Oxford University Press: USA, 2001); and Claire Moon, Narrating Political 
Reconciliation: South Africa‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, (Lexington Books: London and 















if indeed it can be told at all, and further, who decides what the truth is and when it 
has been arrived at.  
This chapter begins by considering what truth commissions in general and 
the Liberian TRC in particular understand truth to be, and further, where their 
understanding arose from and its limitations. This paper puts forward that although 
truth commissions tend to realise that there are alternate ways of understanding truth, 
certain kinds of truths are privileged, viz. legalistic and scientific truths which can be 
corroborated and verified. This chapter will move on to discuss the notion of truth 
from a Nietzschean and post-modernist perspective, reflecting first on the political 
ramifications of this understanding of truth for a truth commission, and secondly, the 
possibilities for redress and healing that this conception of truth holds. From a post-
modernist perspective, therefore, I argue here that a truth commission‟s claim to seek 
and to find an objective truth is misdirected; instead, such commissions have the 
potential to open an official and public arena whereby truth can be created rather 
than found.  
Following a Nietzschean and postmodernist distrust of objective truth, this 
paper puts forward that there are two types of truths that could conceivably be 
produced or created by a truth commission. The first is based on an Orwellian and 
Foucauldian understanding of truth as being manufactured by the state and those in 
power to contain and regulate the subjects, directing them, through hegemonic 
ideologies of truth and knowledge, towards certain political and economic 
objectives.
28
 In this regard, therefore, a truth commission can simply become another 
institutional body which regurgitates the political order of the state through truth- 
and knowledge-claiming discourses masked in the altruistic and regenerative 
discourse of human rights and reconciliation. However, the second truth that truth 
commissions provide a space for is a subjective and multifaceted truth created by the 
stories of the individuals who testify. It is this truth which I argue holds more power 
and promise for the future reconciliation and healing of a post-oppression country, as 
its speakers actively engage in an interpretation of their experiences through a 
creative use of language and narrative, and as the witnesses are required to engage in 
an ethical reading or listening of such testimonies. This chapter therefore examines 
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 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan, 















the question of what kind of understanding of truth leads to what kind of 
reconciliation, and for whom.   
2. A Truth Commission’s Conceptualisation of Truth 
 
Their name proclaims that truth is the primary objective of the work of a truth 
commission. As Charles Villa-Vincencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd describe it, the role 
of a truth commission is „to uncover and acknowledge the truth, so our society could 
at least be free and more forward.‟
29
 But what is a truth commission‟s understanding 
of truth? And what do they mean when their mandate speaks of their mission as 
truth-seeking? 
Considering that truth commissions - as a mechanism of transitional justice - 
fall under the umbrella of human rights, it is necessary to first look at how this 
discourse has previously constructed the notion of truth. Although not explicitly 
stated in the Bill of Rights, there exists a right to th  truth, and this right is one of the 
oldest rights historically struggled for; its inception dates back to John Milton in the 
17
th
 Century who petitioned against censorship as he believed the public held the 
right to know the truth about how their state was managed and conducted.
30
 In 2005 
the United Nations passed a Resolution which instructed the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights to complete a study and report on the right to the 
truth and to update the Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity.31 The understanding here of truth as a 
right is essentially as “knowledge” and, therefore, the right to the truth denotes the 
right to know.  
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 Charles Villa-Vincencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd, Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, (University of Cape Town Press: Cape 
Town, 2000), p. 134.  
30
 See A. C. Grayling, Towards the Light: The Story of the Struggles for Liberty and Rights that Made 
the Modern West, (Bloomsbury: London, 2007), pp. 67 – 69.  
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 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion 
of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, annex II), 
available at ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_9_11.pdf, last accessed 29
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Within the human rights discourse the right to the truth is largely associated 
with freedom of speech and the right to seek public information and knowledge; and 
secondly, with the aspect of humanitarian law which concedes that family members 
have a right to know what happened to relatives who have suffered torture, forced 
disappearances, and extra-judicial killings, for example.
32
 Indeed, in the Report of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Right to the Truth it 
states, „a person has a right to know the truth about what happened to him/her and that 
society as a whole has both a right to know and a responsibility to remember.‟33 Not 
only does this quotation explicitly demonstrate the exchangeability of the 
denotations of “truth” and “knowledge”, but also implicitly demonstrates the 
understanding of truth to be an objective reality in the fact that it can - and should - 
be shared by all society, who hold the „right to know‟ the truth.
34
 
„The right to know the truth‟,
35
 which the Final Report of the Liberian TRC 
expressly claims that all Liberian‟s are entitled to,
36
 implies a certain both traditional 
and positivist notion of truth which has been extended into the mandates and rhetoric 
of numerous truth commissions and, as we shall see, the Liberian TRC. Truth 
commissions tend to hold a truth-seeking mandate which aims to bring into public 
conscious the truth about the atrocities and violence of war, and unite people in a 
shared understanding of the past. This commitment holds two assumptions about the 
nature of truth: the first is that truth is objective and already “out there” or a priori, 
needing simply to be sought and revealed by human methods. Indeed, the fact that 
the writers of the final report have compounded the words „truth‟ and „seeking‟ 
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 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2006), p. 7.  
33
 United Nations Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, 
Right to the Truth, Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/12/19, 
21 August 2009, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-
HRC-12-19.pdf, last accessed 15 July 2011, p. 3 paragraph 5.  
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 Ibid.  
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 Ibid.  
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 Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume Two Consolidated Final 
Report, 2009, available at www.einaudi.cornell.edu/files/content/.../Volume%20Two%20reduced.pdf, 
last accessed 29
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clearly demonstrates this construction of truth as an objective reality to be found.
37
 
Secondly, and stemming from this understanding of objective truth, is the 
assumption that the truth, once revealed, will be common to all, as demonstrated in 
the „right to truth‟.
38
 These constructions of truth arose from the philosophies of 
René Descartes in the Renaissance epoch and Immanuel Kant in the 18
th
 Century.  
Descartes first documented the notion that the individual was a thinking 
subject (Cogito, ergo sum – “I think, therefore I am”) who viewed the world 
objectively.
39
 What Descartes laid out was the philosophical conception of objective 
truth, an idea that was cross-referenced in the advancing discourses of science, 
creating an epistemic paradigm which saw truth being discovered through reason and 
knowledge.
40
 It is this conceptualisation of truth which is evident in the mandate of 
the Liberian TRC as it seeks to find an „independent, accurate and objective record 
of the past‟,
41
 which is to be „sought‟ through „investigating‟, „determining‟ and 
„establishing‟;
42
 such language demonstrating the same Cartesian philosophy that 
truth is objective, waiting to be discovered and found though reason and knowledge.  
Following on from this is the idea expressed in the mandate of the Liberian 
TRC that the truth found will be common to all and come to unite Liberians in a 
shared understanding of the truth of their past.
43
 Although Descartes laid the 
foundation for the idea of objective truth, it was Immanuel Kant in the 18
th
 Century 
who took the idea further, positing that objective truth is universal and shared by all 
as humanity has the same mechanisms with which to experience and understand the 
objective world.
44
 This evolved into his theory on „categorical imperatives‟ which 
describes these universal truths on which we act and think.
45
 This idea of a shared 
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 Immanuel Kant, „Critique of Pure Reason‟, in Louis White Becker (ed), Kant: Selections, 
(Macmillan Press: New York, 1988).  
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and universal truth is implied in the United Nations‟ description of the right to the 
truth which talks of „society as a whole ha[ving] both a right to know and a 
responsibility to remember.‟46  Indeed, according to the United Nations independent 
expert Diane Orentlicher, who wrote the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, the right to 
truth (which, for Orentliceher, is synonymous with the right to know) is principally a 
right owed to „[e]very people‟, rather than to individuals.
47
 What she expresses here 
is the importance of a people to a shared truth, which she explains becomes their 
national „heritage‟ and „history‟.
48
 This concept, which originates from the Kantian 
understanding of truth and categorical imperatives, holds a great deal of weight in 
the ideology behind truth commissions as, for a truth commission, a historical truth 
shared by a nation will be reconciliatory by bringing together all peoples, and 
justiciable in its public acknowledgment of “what really happened”. 
 
2.1 Different Kinds of Truth 
 
Truth commissions in general, and the Liberian TRC specifically, acknowledge that 
the one objective truth, which will explain all the past atrocities and come to stand as 
the country‟s official history, is made up of numerous kinds of truth. They must be 
given credit, then, for their recognition that there is not simply one truth; however, 
and as will be examined here in this chapter, truth commissions favour and prioritise 
a certain kind of truth, privileging the kind that is factual, scientific and legalistic, 
rather than the personal and subjective truths created in the individual testimonies.  
The mandate of the Liberian TRC sets out the framework for the 
establishment of different kinds of truth and, in doing so, determines how these 
different types of truth are prioritised. It is arguable that the Liberian TRC followed 
on from the conceptualisation of the different kinds of truth developed in the 
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workings and report of the South African TRC. The report of the South African TRC 
announces four types of truth: firstly, „forensic truth‟: effectively defined as factual 
truths concerning information about where, when, how, and so forth - this is also a 
legalistic understanding of truth.
49
 Secondly, there was „personal or narrative truth‟ 
which described the subjective truths of the individual testimonies.
50
 Thirdly, „social 
truth‟, which consists of the truths created through dialogue and the social 
engagement of speaking and listening to testimony.
51
 And finally there is 
„reconciliatory‟ or „healing truth‟ which describes the truths brought to light by the 
SATRC process which reminds people of what must never be allowed to happen 
again.
52
   
Although a truth commission is supposed to be a body which bridges the gap 
between legal court rooms and informal dispute mechanisms and victim services, it 
becomes apparent that in many previous truth commissions, notably the South 
African TRC and the Liberian TRC, a legalistic or scientific type of truth is 
prioritised. In short, the „forensic truth‟, or, in the words of Alex Boraine, „objective 
or factual or forensic truth‟,
53
 is the privileged source of truth when it comes to the 
compiling of a truth commission‟s final report, as these truths are hailed as objective 
and, therefore, undisputable. In reference to the South African TRC, Mark Sanders 
comments that „although it declares itself hospitable to storytelling, it proves more at 
ease with statements that can be forensically verified or falsified.‟54 Moreover, Catherine 
M Cole describes how the translating and statement-taking techniques of the South 
African TRC were designed in order to facilitate the bringing about of factual truths: 
„we were told to keep it as brief as possible and only focus on the major points … we 
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had to get the facts, but people wanted to tell their story in broad terms.‟
55
 Indeed, 
Sanders points out that this has been one of the major criticisms of truth 
commissions to date: „the dominant tendency among scholars interpreting Truth 
Commission testimony has been to point to the inadequacy of the Commission‟s 




For the writers of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC 
Deliver?, this is a necessary prioritisation of truth as „the conflation of the subjective 
with objective truth finding weakens the political and moral importance of truth by 
making truth a matter of personal opinion, and not the product of verifiable scientific 
best practices.‟
57
 However, and as will be discussed in more detail later in the 
chapter, this way of seeing and understanding the work of truth within the operations 
of a truth commission excludes other significant ways of seeing truth which, 
arguably, could be more effective at bringing about „true healing and reconciliation‟.   
The Liberian TRC readily states how it was influenced by the workings of 
the South African TRC.
58
 Further, it is evident in the following extract from the 
report of the Liberian TRC that their processes were deliberately designed so as to 
ensure that a certain kind of truth prevailed, viz. the factual and legalistic kind: 
 
The statements forms were specifically designed to be gender sensitive, victim 
friendly, while special forms were designed for children statement-givers. This 
method employed a confidential interview using probing questioning techniques to 
assist the statement-giver in recounting traumatic events or experiences and to 
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Statement-takers were deliberately trained to work past the traumatised memories of 
the individuals who were testifying in order to gain „factual accounts or evidence‟.
60
 
Indeed, it is written in their report that the inquiry unit of the commission was tasked 
to „investigate and corroborate allegations‟ made in such testimonies.
61
 And further, 
the first objective listed in the mandate of the Liberian TRC is the „investigat[ion of] 
gross human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law‟.
62
 
What this therefore demonstrates is the prioritising of those kinds of factual and 
scientific truths, and therefore, the relegation of the importance of the subjective 
truths in the narratives and accounts of those who testify.  
  
3. Criticisms of Objective Truth 
 
The general Cartesian understanding of truth as an objective factual reality, which is 
common to all and can be corroborated and verified, holds the assumption that such 
a reality is separate from human existence. There is, then, a priori of truth to be 
reached, revealed or discovered by human methods, which in itself is intrinsically 
non-human or beyond human capabilities. However, there are certain problems with 
this understanding of truth, which were critiqued by Friedrich Nietzsche, and later by 
the post-structuralists and post-modernists of the 20
th
 Century. Moreover, many have 
criticized - to the avail of Christians and other such monotheistic religions - the idea 
that there is a truth which is beyond human experiences. The argument follows that 
if this were so, it would be impossible to speak the truth as to do so would only ever 
be an approximation of truth as the human tools or language we have to talk of it 
could never, by their very nature, go beyond what is human.
63
  
Nietzsche, on the other hand, decenters the Cartesian and Kantian objectively 
observing self and posited against the idea of objective truth by arguing that reality is 
constituted by subjective interpretations of the world as we directly experience it, 
namely, through our sensory capacity; and therefore, there can never be anything 
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beyond our own human experiences, and hence no objective or universal truth which 
is common to all.
64
 Phenomenological thinking drew along similar lines: skeptical of 
whether there was any truth or reality outside of our sensory experiences, they 
explored the bounds of consciousness as the mechanism for interpreting these 
experiences.
65
 By the latter half of the 20
th
 Century the post-structuralists - and later, 
the post-modernists - were in their advent, theorizing that truth was a function both 
of self-interest and power, and was therefore real only in the sense of its strength as a 
political doctrine. These thinkers followed on from Nietzschean thinking in their 
insistence that truth is subjective and relative, but continued on to describe how 
truth-claims subjectivize the individual, making them modifiable bodies for the 
realization of political and economic goals.
66
 It is criticisms such as these of 
objective truth that become both relevant and useful for an examination of the 
construction of truth in truth commissions. 
For the modernists, whose ideas originated in the philosophies of the early 
modern Renaissance Descartes, their sole purpose was a search for “The Truth”. 
These thinkers believed that there could be found a single truth which would act as a 
panacea for all problems facing the modern world. This understanding of truth 
paralleled ideas on freedom and democracy which were increasingly becoming 
relevant to the then political climate, as it was thought that the truth, once found, 
could be applied to politics, economics and the betterment of society writ large.
67
 
Indeed, this parallel of truth with political ideas of democracy dates back to the 
musings of the poet and political activist John Milton (whose work was circulating in 
England at around the same time as Descartes‟ thinking in France) as, for him, „the 
people can be trusted to arrive at truth and flush out error better than a few appointed 
officials whose timidity or arrogance might make them silence truth to the detriment 
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 Indeed, it is this sort of understanding of an objective truth, that it is both 
democratic in its inclusion of all people and which would ideally contribute to the 
liberty of all from the shackles of a horrendous past, which is found in truth 
commissions in general, and the Liberian TRC specifically. Truth commissions seek 
to rewrite the falsehoods disseminated by the previous autocratic or volatile 
government with a story of the past which is true for all people and, in doing so, 
create a culture for democracy and human rights awareness. Therefore, just like the 
modernist search for truth, truth commissions are similarly seeking a truth which will 
be a panacea for past ills, speak for all and, therefore, add to the betterment and 
liberty of society.  
However, the post-modernists, following on from post-structuralism, rejected 
whole cloth modernism‟s search for truth in grand metanarratives capable of total 
rationalization. Instead, they proposed that if there was such a thing as truth, it was 
culturally constructed, subjective and relative.
69
 These thinkers followed on from 
Nietzsche‟s theories; he rejected the notion of objective or a priori truth, arguing that 
there was nothing outside human experience, and so the objective truths we seek are 
in fact metaphors or allegories we have put there ourselves and have forgotten their 
true nature.
70
 The post-structuralists developed this line of thought and began 
thinking about the powers and agendas behind truth claims. The post-structuralists 
proffered that there were always alternative ways of viewing and experiencing the 
world and that truth claims, depending on their source, precluded and dominated 
over these other versions.
71
 For the post-structuralists Louis Althusser and Michel 
Foucault, truth is a function of power.
72
 Louis Althusser argued that state institutions 
produce ideologies which masquerade as truth and which, through these truth 
claiming ideologies, control and subjectivize the individual.
73
 These „ideological 
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state apparatuses‟, as he named them, called on – or hailed
74
 – individuals in order to 
affect their performance of certain tasks or attitudes necessary for the furtherance of 
the dominant political order. For Althusser all human behavior and thinking was 
controlled by these ideologies.
75
  
Developing on from these ideas, Michel Foucault (originally a pupil of 
Althusser‟s) renamed these ideologies as „discourses‟, which he describes as being 
the structuring agents disseminated by numerous other structures, bodies, 
institutions, or groups, for example, the law, the family, or even - in a modern 
society - advertising and marketing.
76
 Foucault defined these discourses as truth-
claiming narratives which organize, regulate and structure the ways in which we see 
and experience the world in order to give it meaning – they were essentially the 
grand-narratives (or metanarratives) the modernists were searching for.
77
 The self 
became the space which these discourses fought to obtain and subjugate. However, 
there were always certain discourses more powerful than others, discourses which 
were usually phallocentric and which were backed by those in power
78
 – in Marxist 
terms this would be the ruling elite of the prevailing political order of capitalism. In 
short, Foucault argues that truth is a function of the self-interest of those in power, 






3.1 Implications of the Criticisms of Objective Truth 
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What, then, are the ramifications of the post-structuralist understanding of truth on 
the work of a truth commission? There are a number of points to be raised regarding 
most significantly, discourse, subjectivity and power.  
Firstly - and as briefly mentioned above - truth commissions seem to follow a 
modernist conceptualization of truth in their search for some sort of grand narrative 
or truth which can explain all the wrongs of the past. And furthermore, like the 
modernist understanding of truth, this truth is supposed to aid the country in their 
transition to democracy as, once found, it will be a truth common to all. However, I 
argue here that truth commissions do not find truth, rather, they produce it. A truth 
commission produces a grand truth of the past by amalgamating in its final report the 
evidence it brought to light and the testimonies it witnessed.   
Yet, certain kinds of truths are favoured and prioritized in the compiling of 
this report, viz. legalistic or scientific truths, as explained above. From a Foucauldian 
perspective, this new truth – or discourse - of the past generated by a truth 
commission is no different from the falsehoods circulated by the old regime as, for 
Foucault, political theories of freedom and democracy are discourses which serve to 
regulate and control the population by masquerading as truth and knowledge.
80
 
Indeed, according to the account of Foucauldian thought by Pierre de Vos, the new 
democratic and modern state is more controlling and penitentiary-like than the 
violent systems of the past as the apparatus for discipline are more subtle and 
pervasive, for example, surveillance, administration, mass media and so forth: 
 
In the context of modern representative democracy, we can thus conclude that the 
constitution of society and the state through law and the details of power, discipline 
and punishment are all related. They fully interpenetrate one another. Juridical 
equality, explicit legal codes and representative democracy developed along with 
the disciplinary practices that shape mundane activity.
81
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Indeed, this Foucauldian criticism of the modern democratic state led De Vos to 
question the utility of the human rights discourse, a discourse which is characteristic 
of the hegemony of democracy, purposed towards the real alleviation of poverty and 
abjection: „will engagement with human rights not inevitably serve to mask and 
legitimise forms of oppression and exclusion?‟
82
 When viewed from this perspective, 
it becomes clear how a truth commission could be seen to be an Orwellian Ministry 
of Truth, manufacturing truths which become hegemonic political tools that contain 




The construction of the subject is central to the thoughts and theories of post-
structuralism. The notion that individual identity was structured intrinsically and by 
internal conscious experience was radically deconstructed; instead it was posited that 
individual identity was shaped externally by regulating forces in society which mold 
the minds and bodies of its citizens to perform in the most useful fashion for the 
continuance of the dominant order.
83
 The idea of subjectivity and of discourses 
subjectivising the individual is an important one for the evaluation of truth 
commissions, as truth comm ssions arguably produce a discourse which subjugates 
the nation to the demands of the new political order.  
The notion of subjectivity stems from Louis Althusser‟s theory of 
“interpellation” which, arising from symbolic interactionism theories, describes how 
state bodies and institutions call on individuals to play a certain role and act and 
think a certain way.
84
 In short, individuals are hailed to continuously reconstruct 
their identity to suit the economic, political, or other such goals of the state. It is 
through ideological state apparatuses, and their claim to truth and knowledge, that 
the individual is interpellated, or hailed. Foucault developed the rhetoric of this 
theory, renaming ideologies as discourses and explaining how these discourses 
create docile bodies which are used to perform the economic, military, political and 
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other such functions of the state, and so continue the reign of the current political 
order.
85
 In his work Technologies of the Self, Foucault contends that the modern 
democratic state is far more equipped to producing docile bodies as the apparatus for 
discipline and control are more subtle and nuanced:
86
 „modern power requires 
increasingly narrow categories through which it analyzes, differentiates, identifies, 
and administers individuals‟
87
 and, in doing so, makes their bodies sites of docility. 
Therefore, if a truth commission is a discursive act, then through its claims to truth, 
it hails individuals, creating docile bodies of those who participate and listen who 
will - quite literally - be useful for the success of the new political order it seeks to 
promote.   
 
 
3.1.2 The Discursive Nature of Truth Commissions 
 
 
Indeed, for Foucault, and perhaps Althusser, the truths put forth by the work of truth 
commissions would amount to a discourse, or ideological state apparatus, which 
structures and subjectivises the bodies, lives and identities of those who believe in its 
truth claim. By its very title truth commissions claim to hold a legitimate authority 
over truth. Additionally, other already dominant and powerful discourses are used 
within its designs and functions, which allow a truth commission to hold an 
authoritative and influential claim to truth.  
It has been outlined above that Foucault posited that certain discourses -
namely those which fall under the umbrella of science - are dominant and hold a 
stronger claim to truth, marking out other discourses as invalid or, at the very least, 
unreliable.
88
 It follows, therefore, that the appropriation of „forensic truth‟ by truth 
commissions, and the prioritizing of this sort of truth, is a discursive act which 
deliberately appeals to the commonly held value that the scientific discourse has a 
superior access to the truth. The appropriation of this dominant discourse by a truth 
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commission therefore heightens both the truth commissions claim to know the truth 
and secondly, their position of authority and influence.  
Furthermore, although Foucault never directly expressed it as such, 
proponents of Foucauldian thought have argued that the law is another such 
dominant discourse which disqualifies
89
 and dominates over other ways of thinking 
or seeing the world. Arguing that law is a dominating discourse in her article „The 
Power of Law‟, Carol Smart explains thus: „law sets itself outside the social order, as 
if through the application of legal method and rigour it becomes a thing apart which 
can in turn reflect upon the world from which it is divorced.‟
90
 Indeed, truth 
commissions, although they claim to bridge the gap between the legal court room 
and informal dispute mechanisms, in fact adopt much of the legal discourse and 
method within their structures and functioning. This is ironic considering human 
rights - the prevalent discourse of truth commissions - is supposed to hold in check 
sovereignty or excess power, yet the realization of these rights is through one of the 




Consider Diane Orentlicher‟s definition of a truth commission: „the phrase 
“truth commissions” refers to official, temporary, non-judicial fact-finding bodies 
that investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights or humanitarian law, usually 
committed over a number of years.‟
92
 Although she claims these truth commissions 
are „non-judicial‟, she uses a legal semantic field to describe their operations: 
„official‟, „fact-finding‟, „investigate‟, „human rights or humanitarian law‟, and 
„committed‟. The testimonies of individuals are required to be „investigate[d]‟ just 
like the testimonies of witnesses in the court room. Furthermore, truth commissions 
subscribe to a legalistic construction of truth as objective „fact[s]‟, as they favor the 
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appropriation of factual evidence rather than, for example, emotional catharsis and 
personal epiphanies.  
Moreover, the appropriation of the dominant legal discourse by a truth 
commission in fact manipulates the whole testimony process as the contents of any 
testimony, statement or account must strictly fall within the legally defined bounds 
of  „Egregious Domestic Crimes‟, „Gross Human Rights Violations‟ and „Serious 
Humanitarian Law Violations‟.
93
 This therefore renders invalid the statement made 
in the mandate of the Liberian TRC that the commission provides an opportunity for 
people to „share their experiences‟
94
 as only those experiences which can be legally 
categorized are accepted. This conflation of the narratives of the individuals into 
certain categories of legally defined offenses meant that the commission lacked the 
capacity to examine some of the structural causes of the Liberian civil war and meant 
that there were many truths which were left out of being officially acknowledged and 




Furthermore, privileging a legalistic truth found in facts and evidence over 
subjective interpretations, narratives and memories, could - ironically - be severely 
detrimental to the investigative mandate the commission is trying to fulfil. Charles 
Villa-Vincencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd speak of this problem in terms of the legal 
system of apartheid South Africa: „the apartheid era courts were faced with the 
dilemma of weighting testimony from a detainee about how he was assaulted, 
against the derails of the police and the security forces, who were backed by a 
district surgeon‟.
96
 Indeed, this also demonstrates how the legal discourse employs a 
scientific discourse (the „district surgeon) to - in the words of Carol Smart - „extend 
its legitimacy‟.
97
 But, moreover, the privileging of the legal discourse and legal 
truths could result in those without the means to adhere to the complexities of the 
legal system being left in an inequitable position, unable to speak their truth.  
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Effectively, then, truth commissions employ certain discourses which 
historically have been accepted by society as dominant and, therefore, truthful. The 
employment of these dominant discourses is for the large part what makes a truth 
commission an „official‟ body, and this official-ness is largely what gives a truth 
commission its authority and encourages people to listen when it speaks.  
 
3.2 The Political Motivations of the Discourse of Truth Commissions 
 
 
It is furthermore evident that truth commissions announce a disciplinary discourse 
which moulds and subjugates individuals to a certain way of thinking and acting, as 
the need for truth by truth commissions is politically motivated. Namely, the 
political drive behind truth commissions is to move a nation away from one 
autocratic governmental regime to a democratic state which is conscious of its 
human rights obligations. For the Liberian TRC the truth needed was one that would 
„facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation‟.
98
 There was, therefore, a clearly 
mandated purpose and necessity for the truth: the truth needed was politically 
motivated in that it needed to be a truth that would aid in the reconciliation of a 
country which had been severel  ravaged by horrendous civil war, and it was needed 
to reunite a fractured nation and bring about trust and confidence in the new 
government.  However, as argued above, following Foucauldian thought these 
political theories of freedom and democracy that characterize the new state order 
simply act in the same way as the previous more violent regimes, as they discipline 
and subjugate individuals through their claims to truth and the organising and 
structuring mechanisms of society that see this power effected. 
Foucault‟s ideas on power, truth-claiming narratives and subjectivity hold 
their origins in the theories of Friedrich Nietzsche. Ken Gemes explains that 
Nietzsche‟s „notion of truth is used to escape responsibility for one‟s actions and 
beliefs and is employed as a means of coercing uniformity of belief.‟
99
 According to 
Gemes, then, truth-claiming discourses allow for a kind of self-subjugation to the 
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powers behind them, in that they discourage thinking for oneself, rather fostering the 
relinquishment of the individual‟s agency over their „actions and beliefs‟.
100
 Further, 
in this relinquishment of individual agency comes the relinquishment of 
individuality as people are homogenized into a uniformed way of thinking and 
acting. For this reason, we cannot ignore the call for unification by the Liberian 
government: the new president of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf speaks of how the 
Liberian TRC needs to find a „unifying narrative‟ for the country,
101
 and further, the 
mandate of the Liberian TRC speaks of  
 
Strengthening the national integration and unity of the people of Liberia, regardless 
of ethnic, regional or other differences, into one body politic; and the Legislature 
shall enact laws promoting national unification and the encouragement of all 




Indeed, the TRC Mandate has directly quoted here from the 1986 Constitution of 
Liberia, demonstrating then, how legal discourse effectively constitutes the identities 
of those who fall under its rule. Normalization - or the unification of people into „one 
body politic‟ - is a very effective tool for the realization of political, economic, 
military and other such goals: it is the very objective of what Foucault calls 
disciplinary discourses.
103
   
This idea that truth is a homogenizing agent - an idea which we have seen is 
picked up by the post-structuralists in their theories on discourse and ideologies - is 
an important one when considering the notion of reconciliation as, according to its 
definition, reconciliation, too, encourages „uniformity of belief‟ in its attempts to 
unite opposing ideas and people.
104
 „To reconcile means not only reestablishing 
friendly relations, but reconciling contradictory facts or stories, “to make (discordant 
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facts, statements, etc.) consistent, accordant or compatible with each other”.‟
105
 
Arguably, then, reconciliation could be conceived of as a political tool which works 
towards conforming society towards the same understanding of the past, so goals of 
the future can together be realized. In this way, reconciliation itself becomes a truth-
claiming discourse, subjugating a society into politically useful minds and bodies 
that will ensure the success of the new political order.
106
 Indeed, it is worth 
considering here Stewart Motha‟s thesis that reconciliation is another form of 
colonial domination as it seeks to unify people towards a modern, and let us add 
Western, way of governance:   
 
The „time‟ of reconciliation is marked and delineated by the possibility of 
producing a renewed polity or „political community‟. This process of re-inscribing 
the „political‟ under „one-law‟ subordinates indigenous laws and customs, once 
again, in the name of „civilisation‟, and its new effigies, democracy and human 
rights. Reconciliation […] returns a form of domination through the subordination 





Surely then, as truth commissions are typically sponsored by international - and 
usually western-based - NGO‟s, or by the United Nations, they adopt ways of 
reconciliation, justice and peace-making which are in line with international 
standards, less cognisant of local dispute settlement mechanisms, and therefore, 
arguably, encouraging the hegemony of Western democracy.
108
   
 
4. An Alternative Truth 
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I began above to illicit an argument that instead of finding truth, truth commissions 
create it. One way in which they do this is by creating, in Foucauldian terms, a new 
disciplinary discourse which subjugates the people of the nation to the new political 
order. However, there is another truth which truth commissions provide an official 
space for the creation of, a truth which is created by the stories and narratives of 
those who come to testify. Developing on from Nietzschean theories on the notion of 
truth, I argue here that this truth, unlike the truth-claims of the disciplinary discourse 
generated by a truth commission, is a truth which could lead to genuine healing and 
reconciliation as the story-tellers engage in the creative act of narration and those 
who listen to these stories of their past are required to partake in an ethical hearing or 
reading.  
Rejecting the positivist philosophies of Descartes and Kant, Nietzsche argued 
against the idea that there are universal and objective truths, or categorical 
imperatives, that are shared by all. According to Nietzsche, truth - as is commonly 
understood - does not exist. Instead there are a collection of „metaphors‟ or linguistic 
symbols which over time we have come to treat as universal and even transcendental 
truths: 
 
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long 
usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions 




Therefore, objective a priori truth has no “real” existence as truths are constructed 
through language and, hence, are only valid in a textual and subjective world. Take, 
for example, the maxim commonly used in court rooms and was asked of people to 
state before speaking their testimony before the Liberia TRC: “the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth”: „the Primary Witness was then sworn to tell the truth 
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and nothing but the truth by the TRC Hearings Officer‟.
110
 This phrase is rhetorically 
constructed in a tripartite epistrophe;
111
 however, this linguistic construction is 
forgotten in favour of the notion that those who partake in this speech act will follow 
its order with a submission of truth. This example, then, highlights how truth is a 
linguistic construct as a truth claim is only true within the textual or linguistic world 
to which it is created and refers. For Nietzsche, these truths become a necessary and 
comforting illusion, providing humanity with a sense of purpose and confidence: 
„only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live 
with any repose, security and consistency'.
112
 Instead, he proposed that truth lies in 
the sensual world which we individually interpret.
113
 For him, therefore, „there are 
no facts, only interpretations‟,
114
 those interpretations we make as we read the 
sensory signs and symbols of our daily lives. 
 Nietzsche‟s argument that humankind are „artistically creating subject[s]‟
115
 
can be extended with effect to the notion that truth commissions provide a space 
whereby subjective truths can be created, officially acknowledged, and publically 
heard and recorded. The mandate of the Liberian TRC lists the second objective of 
the truth commission as „providing a forum that will address issues of impunity, as 
well as an opportunity for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to 
share their experiences in order to create a clear picture of the past so as to facilitate 
genuine healing and reconciliation‟.
116
 Although this paper is critical of the stricture 
that testimonies of past suffering must fall into the legal definitions of human rights 
law and humanitarian law, this paper commends the notion that through the sharing 
of experiences „genuine healing and reconciliation‟ can be achieved. Indeed, I argue 
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here that subjective truths are created through the creative stories and narratives of 
those who testify as they interpret their memories of the past and creatively 
reconstruct the symbols of oppression, persecution and violence into a narrative 
which tells of their suffering.  
In her renowned book, which delved into and deconstructed the identity and 
nature of the South African TRC, Antjie Krog conveyed a similar message in her 
insistence on the importance of telling. For Krog, all stories of apartheid told of a 
unique and necessary truth and, in the very act of telling and story-telling, truths 
were created:  
 
“Hey Antjie, but this is not quite what happened at the workshop,” says 
Patrick. 
“Yes I know, it‟s a new story that I constructed […] I‟m not reporting or 
keeping minutes. I‟m telling. […] I cut and paste the upper layer, in order to get to 
the second layer told, which is actually the story I want to tell. […]” 
“But then you are not busy with the truth!” 
“I am busy with the truth … my truth. Of course, it‟s quilted together from 
hundreds of stories that we‟ve experienced or heard about in the past two years. 
Seen from my perspective, shaped by my state of mind at the time and now also by 
the audience I‟m telling the story to. In every story there is hearsay, there is a 
grouping together of things that didn‟t necessarily happen together, there are 
assumptions, ther  are exaggerations to bring home the enormities of situations, 
there is downplaying to confirm innocence. And all of this together makes up the 





In this passage the real and fictional Krog converses with the real and fictional 
Patrick, demonstrating the exchangeability of truth and fiction as we commonly 
understand it, and the significance of literature or narrative as a site for the creation 
of a different kind of truth.  
Yet, as explained above, truth commissions tend to prioritize factual and 
objective truths and therefore do not extend enough importance to the truths created 
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in individual testimonies. However, to date, one truth commission has actively 
acknowledged the value of the creative accounts of individuals describing past 
violence and atrocity. Priscialla Hayner describes thus:  
 
The main idea was to get people to talk. Relying on members of the community to 
take testimony after receiving training by the national office, the REMHI 
[Guatemala the Recovery of Historical Memory Project] project was much more 
focused on the process and impact of collecting testimony than on the final 




This paper posits that future truth commissions must take example from the REMHI 
truth commission and focus on the simple necessity of encouraging people to talk 
and others to listen, as this conversation is, in itself, an act of peace-making and 
reconciliation.  
However, if the argument is followed that truth is created rather than found, it 
is worth noting that there are other creative mediums, besides speech and language, 
through which truth can be created and shared. Indeed, despite criticism, many truth 
commissions have been cognisant f the capacity of creative acts to tell and share 
moments of truth.
119
 The Liberian TRC, for example, sponsored the creation of an art 
gallery to display the work of Liberian children telling of their experiences of the 
country‟s civil war: 
 
On September 27, 2008, The TRC‟s Children‟s Art Gallery was officially opened 
by the Vice President of Liberia, H. E. Joseph N. Boakai. It featured poems, stories, 
and drawings by children about their experiences during the Liberian Civil War and 
how they envision the future of Liberia. The art was obtained from all across 
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Therefore, despite not giving enough official emphasis to the testimonies of 
individuals in the final reports, some truth commissions do, to some extent, 
acknowledge the importance of the creative act for a society‟s engagement with 
truth. However, in erecting an institutional site whereby further truths could be 
created in the artworks of the children of Liberia, the Liberian TRC undermined its 
own claim to be the final and authoritative truth about the country‟s past and, in so 
doing, deconstructed their own truth-claim.  
4.1 The Ethics of Witnessing Testimony 
 
In comparison to official truths generated by states or other such official bodies, the 
subjective truths of the narratives and stories of individuals demand an ethical, and 
therefore active, reading or listening. Unlike officially sanctioned truths and histories 
which are simply accepted at face value (which is, for Foucault, why they retain so 
much power behind their truth-claims), the subjective truths of narratives and stories 
are listened to or read with a critical ear, which in fact allows them to be read 
ethically. Indeed, when one listens to the stories of those narrating their past 
sufferings and persecutions there is an ethical obligation or responsibility to engage 
in that story and, in it, share in the truth of the other. It is this sort of understanding 




 Although I employ the word „story‟ to speak of the testimonies given at truth 
commissions, I do not use the word to connote that the context of these testimonies 
are necessarily fictional, but to point out the link between the narrative structure of 
story-telling and the narrative structure which is fundamentally present in the 
expression of experience in language. The relation, then, between narrative and 
ethics is one that has been pointed out and debated on for centuries. Indeed, 
Aristotle, one of the foremost thinkers who pursued the philosophy of poetry, 
contended that in poetry, or narrative, we naturally identify with the characters and 
accounts given and, in doing so, both heuristically and pedagogically learn ethical 
lessons through the confrontation and the working through of the ethical issues and 
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circumstances presented to us.
122
 In Country of My Skull Krog speaks of this ethical 
identification that occurred during the process of witnessing testimony at the South 
African TRC: „the more you empathize with the victim, the more you become the 
victim‟.
123
 Indeed, Graham Ward insists that through reading literature – or, for that 
matter, witnessing testimony - „we constitute another world, internally, that expands 
our being in the world, externally‟;
124
 and further, „reading is a following after, a 
submission to, a living and experiencing beyond oneself, the entering into new sets 
of relation; and the disposition is fundamentally ethical‟.
125
 Therefore, both through 
the creative act of narrative and through the witnessing of such acts, truths are shared 
through the ethical obligation to listen, to identify and to understand what is being 
said.   
 
4.2  Truth and Reconciliation 
 
The idea of creating new truths becomes significant when another meaning of 
reconciliation is considered. I proffered the argument earlier that reconciliation – in 
the field of transitional justice - could be seen as a political tool which homogenizes 
beliefs, understandings and attitudes to be in line with the new modern and 
democratic (and, arguably, Western) political order. However, reconciliation could 
be reconceived in a mo e positive fashion as, rather than trying to reconcile two 
opposing sources of meaning, a site for the creation of new meaning. This re-
conceptualisation of reconciliation as a place for the creation of new meaning lies 
parallel to the argument proffered here that truth commissions can foster the creation 
of new truths. Indeed, speech and language have long been considered place for the 
creation of new meanings: Komesaroff talks of how „speech and language are at 
once the primordial foundation of ethics and society and a great and unlimited 
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creative source of meaning‟.
126
 In this way, reconciliation could be reconceived as 
the process by which meaning is created both through the testimonies of individuals 
as they engage in the creative act of speech, through the ethical witnessing of such 
testimonies and through the dialogues that should, necessarily, ensue.  
Sadly, the Liberian TRC lost a valuable opportunity for the fostering of this 
sort of dialogical and creative reconciliation is their inability to operate the actual 
meeting of victim and perpetrator; according to the report, „the TRC decided against 
providing a venue for the accuser, particularly the most violent ones, to confront the 
accused, for security reasons, among others‟.
127
 However, one initiative was 
followed which, hopefully, has encouraged dialogue between Liberians: namely, the 
Palava Huts. Accordingly, „the Palava Hut is another form of justice and 
accountability mechanism with traditional orientation to foster national healing and 
reconciliation at the community and grass-roots level creating opportunity for 
dialogue and peace-building.‟
128
 The Palava Huts were designed to encourage what 
the report spoke of as „community-based atonement‟.
129
 Indeed, it is hoped that, 
although officially sanctioned by the state, such forums will encourage a localised 
reconciliation between neighbours in a manner both necessary and realistic for the 







It is always difficult to talk about truth. Without a concrete conceptualisation of truth 
as that which is real, present and apparent, all experience and existence is thrown in 
the air, no longer grounded by the notion of truth. It is comforting, therefore, to 
believe in truth, as with truth comes a sense of understanding of where we are and 
                                                          
126
 Paul A. Komesaroff, „Pathways to Reconciliation: Bringing Diverse Voices into Conversation‟, in 
Philipa Rothfield, Cleo Fleming and Paul A. Komesaroff (eds.) Pathways to Reconciliation, (Ashgate 
Publishing: Hampshire, 2008), p. 4. 
127
 Supra note 11 at 29.  
128
 Supra note 36 at 364. 
129















what we are doing. But, I believe it is also both necessary and important to question 
truth, to question the source of truth and to question the reason for truth. This chapter 
has attempted to do just that, and specifically to question the notion of truth when it 
is present in the re-structuring of transitional societies, as that which is presented as 
truth comes to shape the lives and identities of those which it speaks of and about.   
 I have argued against the idea of objective truth that is promulgated by truth 
commissions in their desire for, and prioritising of, factual and legalistic truths. This 
chapter has argued that truth commissions, both of themselves and through their 
employment of legal and scientific structures, are, in the words of Louis Althusser, 
an „ideological state apparatus‟.
130
 Indeed, truth commissions are designed to usher 
in the new political order, and, arguably, this is done through denouncing the old 
regime as autocratic and violent, and through promoting a new discourse of 
democracy and truth which serves to subjugate the nation once more to another 
political order.  
 On the other hand, however, I contend that truth commissions provide a 
space for an ethical engagement with the other and the truths of the other through the 
creative act of testimony. This paper sees the act of publically testifying as highly 
significant for the future reconciliation of a country as people are asked to come 
together to share in each other‟s meanings and to create new ones. Indeed, a 
commissioner at a hearing of the Liberian TRC commented to the testimony-maker 
that, „the most important value from what you said today is that others can learn 
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„Dirt[ies] you so bad you couldn‟t like yourself anymore. Dirty you so bad you 
forgot who you were and couldn‟t think it up‟. 
 
„All of it is now   it is always now   there will never be a time when I am not 
crouching and watching others who are crouching too   I am always crouching   
the man on my face is dead   his face is not mine‟. 




            
 





The act of testifying and the notion of testimony are central to the concept and 
functioning of a truth commission. According to the mandate of the Liberian TRC 
the testimonies of individuals who during the course of the Liberian civil war have 
suffered serious and gross human rights violations and violations of humanitarian 
law are to come together to form a true and widely accepted picture of the past that 
will come to stand as the nation‟s official history. Furthermore, through the act of 
testifying, those who suffered are given a chance to share their experiences with their 
fellow citizens and, in this way, build a national consensus as to what can never 
again be allowed to happen, and allow the individual testifying and the country as a 
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whole to heal. Lastly, through testimony the victims and survivors of serious and 
gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law will restore the dignity stole 
from them by their perpetrators and attain justice through the naming of their 
violators.  
 However, it is not so simple to “tell the truth” and “explain what happened”. 
Theorizing on the process of making testimony, John Henry Wigmore explains thus:  
 
When a witness‟ statement is offered as the basis of an evidential inference to the 
truth of his statement – for example, the statement of A that B struck X – it is plain 
that as least three distinct elements are present; or, put in another way, that there are 
three processes, in the absence of any one of which we cannot conceive of 
testimony: 
       First, the witness must know something, i.e., must have observed the affray 
and received some impressions on the question whether B struck X; to this element 
may be given the generic term observation.  
       Second, the witness must have a recollection of these impressions, the result of 
his observation; this may be termed recollection; 
       Third, he must communicate this recollection to the tribunal; that is there must 




There are then three steps, according to Wigmore, in the process of testimony-
making or statement giving, viz. the knowledge of what was observed or 
experienced, a recollection of this, and an ability to communicate this knowledge and 
recollection. However, there are certain problems, both theoretical and practical, 
with this tripartite construction of the process of testimony. Taking Wigmore‟s 
definition of testimony, this chapter endeavours to deconstruct some of the concerns 
of testimony-making at truth commissions. Considering that the majority of 
testimonies given at truth commissions consist of traumatic memories, this chapter 
argues that such memories, by their very nature, resist telling, resist hearing, and 
resist being historicised, against the objective of truth commissions. 
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Indeed, those who suffer traumatic experiences often fail to grasp the reality 
of what happened, and hence, in short, hold little knowledge about the actual 
experience. Furthermore, traumatic memories resist normal recollection as they do 
not subscribe to the usual form of memory; rather, the experience of trauma is 
inscribed into the body and psyche of the self, and, in Freudian terms, becomes a 
kind of repressed memory, unable to be chronologically ordered in the mind.
134
 It is 
for this reason - that memory is inherently a-temporal - that this chapter argues that 
traumatic memories cannot be used to establish a historical past. Lastly, traumatic 
memories resist being communicated as there is not language sufficient to describe 
and relate the traumatic experience, and, the substance of trauma is outside of most 
people‟s frame of reference to understand and internalize, thereby making trauma 
testimony inherently difficult to hear. Furthermore, this chapter considers 
phenomenological and linguistic theories in evaluating whether experience can ever 






It is difficult to define trauma objectively as what constitutes a traumatic experience 
will vary from person to person as trauma is essentially an experience which, unable 
to be understood and processed, effects a person so much it fundamentally changes 
their self and identity.
136
 The word “trauma” has its etymological roots in the Greek 
for “wound” which aligns the meaning of trauma to a deep piercing of the skin - the 
internal puncture of an external object.
137
 Indeed, bound in the concept and 
physicality of wounding and trauma is a power relation, of something external over-
powering and entering into a deep internal self, leaving the wounder with greater 
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knowledge of – and power over - that self than the wounded her-/himself. In this 
way, trauma is inherently political in its concern with overpowering, and holding 
knowledge of, the self. In this way the traumatic event is like a discourse, 
subjugating the self, rendering it incapable of undoing the effects of that trauma, and 
forcing it to a life of subordination to both the power of the wounder and the 
traumatic memory.
138
 Culbertson talks of how „in such violence and violation one‟s 
life is no longer one‟s own in a most fundamental way‟,
139
 and demonstrating how 
the self is overcome by the power of the trauma and the traumatiser.  
 The Liberians who came to testify about their experiences of the civil war at 
the TRC had to fulfil a certain criteria: the experiences of which they testified about 
had to amount to a human rights violation or a violation of humanitarian law.
140
 It is 
arguable that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
141
 and other such human 
rights or humanitarian law documents, list the conditions of humanity, meaning the 
rights declared in these documents are the attributes which make people human, 
distinguishing them from animals or other organisms. In this way, any violation of 
these rights constitutes an act of dehumanization. Furthermore, considering trauma 
is, by nature, a human response to an utterly inhuman experience, it can be argued 
that all human rights violations or violations of humanitarian law are traumatic. This 
chapter will consider the effects of trauma on the TRC‟s objectives of testimony-
making, arguing that truth commissions often fail to grasp the complex and intricate 
nature of trauma and the impossibility of traumatic experiences to be completely 




2. Knowledge  
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Both in accordance with Wigmore and generally speaking, in order to give 
testimony, some sort of knowledge must be known and conveyed; this knowledge is 
usually what necessitates the testimony-giving.
143
 However, what if the individual 
testifying is attempting to talk of a traumatic experience they themselves have 
survived: is it so simple as to just convey recollected knowledge? This section 
examines some of the difficulties of testifying in order to convey knowledge when 
the subject of that testimony is an individual‟s trauma, and considers the notion that 
a traumatic experience is known and understood not by the conscious mind but 
rather by the body.  
The Liberian TRC clearly outlines their position that despite testimony-
making being an opportunity to regain lost dignity by the speaker, to heal through 
the psychotherapeutic nature of narrative, and to seek justice for past wrongs 
committed against the individual speaker, the testimonies at the TRC are to be used 
to gather information about the civil war. Indeed, the report of the Liberian TRC 
speaks of how they „employed a confidential interview using probing questioning 
techniques to assist the statement-giver in recounting traumatic events or experiences 
and to provide factual accounts or evidence of events that took place‟.
144
 Implicit in 
this quotation from the TRC report is the notion that the traumatic nature of many of 
the testimonies was, for the realisation of the TRC‟s objectives, a kind of obstacle to 
be overcome in the path of gathering information and knowledge concerning the 
failings and atrocities of Liberia‟s past. Furthermore, the transcripts of the days of 
interviewing by commissioners of those who come to testify reveal how the 
testimonies of witnesses were probed for factual information: „what year did this 




This chapter is critical of the prioritised objective of the Liberian TRC to 
gather information and knowledge from the testimony-makers, rather than allowing 
these people the opportunity to simply tell their story and allow it to be heard. In this 
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way, it is arguable that, because of the need of truth commissions to gather facts and 
information from the testimonies of war‟s survivors, the traumatic experiences of the 
people who come to testify are used to secure the political success of the new order 
by condemning the failure and violence of the previous government.  
Furthermore, it is arguable whether any such factual information or 
knowledge can indeed be retrieved from the testimonies of trauma suffers as trauma 
is, by definition, a response to something so alien to human experience that it cannot 
be processed or recognized by the human mind. Indeed, the psychiatrist Gordon 
Turnbull tells of how trauma „is the impact of an event which, for some reason or 
other, the survivor has not been able to process, not because the mind can‟t do the 
processing – because it is flawed in some way – but because it hasn‟t had the 
opportunity.‟
146
 In this way, the trauma survivor has no real knowledge of what 
happened to them and will therefore face severe difficulties in trying to testify about 
the event.  
According to Sigmund Freud, the psychoanalyst who was thought to pioneer 
the movement towards understanding trauma as a psychological response, „trauma 
resulted from a rupture or breach in the protective shield of the consciousness‟.
147
 
Looking closely at the use of language here it is evident that, for Freud, the traumatic 
experience should, ideally, not enter our consciousness, as the very fact that it does 
constitutes a „rupture or breach‟.  
Essentially th n, a traumatic experience should be repressed by the 
unconscious mind and, in this way, not enter into conscious knowledge. However, 
the traumatic memory does manifest itself in the conscious mind, but this 
manifestation is not as a kind of knowledge or understanding, but rather as what 
Cathy Caruth explains as „repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts or 
behaviours‟.
148
 Indeed, it is this very non-knowing about the event that constitutes it 
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as traumatic, and what makes it, for Jean Francois Lyotard, „a revelation that never 
reveals itself but remains there‟.
149
  
For trauma theorist Culbertson, this non-knowable characteristic of trauma is 
necessary, for it is the survival instinct of the body and the unconscious protecting 
the self: 
 
She knows much more is there, but to know it fully is to suffer again what her body 
worked so hard to protect her from before: the experience of her near dissolution 
and the pain associated with it. Then it would have killed her, or let her act in a way 




For Culbertson, then, the traumatic memory or experience is what she calls 
„primary‟,
151
 it is physically and unconsciously known and remembered before it is 
consciously known, if it is ever consciously known at all. And furthermore, this is a 
necessary survival instinct, preventing the trauma from being re-lived in conscious 
thought and knowledge. Therefore, one can never have true knowledge of a 
traumatic event as that event was never properly registered by the mind at the time of 
its happening, and necessarily so, in order to preserve the body and mind from 
annihilation. In this way, it is therefore paradoxical for a truth commission to wish to 
seek information and knowledge from an individual‟s accounts of their traumatic 
experiences, as that individual does not directly possess this knowledge in their 
conscious mind.  
Instead, it is the body that knows and remembers the trauma. In her article 
„Embodied Memory, Transcendence, and Telling: Recounting Trauma, Re-
Establishing the Self‟ Culbertson describes how a traumatic event „is not known in 
words, but in the body‟,
152
 and later, that „they are remembered at the level of the 
body and the uncalculating mind, not at the level of everyday, functioning, speaking 
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 Indeed, considering that typically a traumatic experience is one of severe 
violence as the individual suffers a violation of their bodily integrity and that the 
etymological root of “trauma” is the Greek for “wound”, trauma is, therefore, 
fundamentally a bodily experience as the body is, quite literally, wounded.  The 
trauma is inscribed onto the body of its survivor rather than the mind as the mind 
lacks the referential capacity to hold any true knowledge as to what took place, and 
the body necessarily needs to hold the knowledge of what happened in order to 
protect it against a repeated occurrence.  
Yet, for Michael Humphrey, the body is more than just the site for the 
knowledge of the trauma, as he explains in his article „From Terror to Trauma: 
Commissioning Truth for National Reconciliation‟;
154
 the body becomes a cultural, 
and arguably political, symbol and mark of violent power: 
 
But when violence ends, after the cease-fire is announced or the military has 
returned to the barracks, the traces of violence survive in its victims. Soldiers carry 
the wounds of war, torture victims the scars of brutal repression and the survivors 
of genocide the horrors of the threat of social extinction. Their suffering continues 
because of the body‟s capacity for memory. The body remembers violence as pain 
too well. And the pain refers to its origins in the torturer, the rapist, the assassin. 
Thus violence is both personal and cultural because it makes victims in relation to a 




Extending Humphrey‟s position it is arguable that the traumatised body is, quite 
literally, made docile by the violence done against it and, in this way, is subjugated 
to the political order and demands of its violator. Furthermore, these traumatised and 
docile bodies become the ideal site whereby a new politic can prevail, a new politic 
like that of the ensuing government which truth commissions bolster.   
 Consider the testimony of Amelia Dimsea from the Liberian TRC:  
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When we came they wrote on small-small papers and wasted them on the ground. 
They told us that they will not be killing Liberians again since Taylor came and 
suffer you people. They told us to choose from the papers, anything that is on the 
paper is what they will do to you. Me I was lucky the paper I choose it was written 
on for them to design me. They put a paper in my mouth, they said go and carry it 
to Charles Taylor. I was bleeding throughout when I got in one village, the people 
there now-now (presently) so the people help and tied cloths around me. The 
people help me and pas me through to Monrovia. When I got to Monrovia, they 
took me to JFK Hospital; there was no doctor there so they sent for one Chinese 
doctor from Cooper's Clinic. So he the one try small to give me stitches. So since 
that time that how I have been, even from here now I am going for treatment to 
Bomi. It was band knife they used on me. Each hospital I will go to they will they 
will say I should bring US dollars. I even went to Jewel Taylor but still no help, 
even my children, my seven children, the smallest one always ask me about the 
marks on me, I say the LURD rebels. So he too say he want to join the army, I say 
no. we were living to Defense when the TRC came there they saw me, they say you 
don't have anything to say to the TRC? I say I coming, this thing I na (have) explain 
it to plenty people, and they don't do anything for me and the children. I explained 
the story to them and they said they will come for me. One of the girls, I took up 




Significantly, the central trauma suffered by Amelia Dimsea is left unspoken. She 
cannot speak of the violence by which her body is left with these „marks‟, as her 
testimony jumps from speaking about the piece of paper in her mouth, to her 
bleeding body as she enters the village. Indeed, Amelia Dimsea‟s body became a 
symbol for the violence of the LURD rebels, as they, quite literally, marked her. And 
later, she comes „to show‟ these marks to the TRC as a physical sign of the 
brutalities of the warring factions. Amelia Dimsea‟s testimony demonstrates, 
therefore, this inability to know, remember and speak of, a deeply traumatic event. 
Instead, it is her body with its marks of LURD‟s torture, which speaks at the TRC, 
showing those watching the truth of their violence.
157
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3. Memory (or Recollection) 
 
Traumatic memories are not memories per se.
158
 In order to testify at a truth 
commission one would need to first have some sort of memory of what had 
happened in order to retell the experience as testimony. However, quite simply, 
traumatic experiences refuse memory or, at the very least, refuse to be of a typical 
memory form. This section will look at the relationship between trauma and 
memory, examining the negotiable nature of memory; memory and testimony as a 
site for the self-construction of identity; and finally, the difficulties of trying to 
historicize traumatic experience. 
Truth commission‟s seek, in the testimonies of individuals, memories of 
violence and violation in order to recreate a national memory of the past that is, 
arguably, a truthful account of the nation‟s history. The memories of the individuals 
who testify hold considerable weight: these memories become the source of truth and 
meaning for a whole nation, and further, are hailed as a symbol of justice and 
reconciliation for the sufferings of all. Yet, a truth commission‟s understanding of 
memory as a source of knowledge and truth that can serve as a vehicle to learn of the 
past of the nation, is deeply problematic. This section will explore the notion of 
memory, examining just how far memories of trauma and violence can serve the 
purpose of truth, history, justice and reconciliation. 
 Whether or not the memory content is traumatic, memories are far more 
complex than simple recollections of the past. A truth commission‟s understanding 
of memory to be a clean source of knowledge and information – be it subjective – is 
flawed, as memories are an unreliable source of this kind of truth. Indeed, Culbertson 
talks of how memories -and especially traumatic memories - „appear in nonnarrative 
forms that seem to meet no standard test for truth or comprehendability‟.
159
 When 
one remembers, certain things are forgotten and repressed, whilst others are 
highlighted, even more so when the memory is traumatic. Furthermore, memory is 
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performative as it responds to the needs of those listening and the situation to which 
it is being spoken. Indeed, Steven Robins speaks of how „memories are unstable, 
suffer the degradations of time, the pressures of the present and are often subject to 
self-serving revision and manipulation as well as the forgetting, silences, denials, and 
repression that traumas produce.‟
160
 Yet, more than this: memory is active and 
unfixed, it is more than just a source of knowledge and experience, but a creative 
technology of the self whereby knowledge, experience, meaning and identity are 
both created and constituted.
161
  Memories of the past constitute the past in a new 
way.  
On the one hand, therefore, truth commissions arguably provide a time and a 
space for those people most sorely affected by a nation‟s terrible past to reinvent this 
past through the creative and constituting agency of their memory. On the other 
hand, however, the vulnerable nature of these traumatic memories leaves them open 
to revision by powerful government groups who need these memories to paint a 
certain picture of their past so a certain present can prevail. Indeed, we have seen 
how the Liberian TRC used deliberate techniques in their testimony-taking 




3.1 Memory and Identity 
 
Memory, testimony and trauma are all intimately concerned with ideas of the self 
and identity. I have mentioned above that memory is both creative and constituting. 
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Indeed, in this way memory creates and constitutes identity as certain aspects of the 
self are remembered and others forgotten. And furthermore, through testimony these 
memories become performative, projecting a certain image of the self. Consider 
Marie Konyan‟s construction of her self in her testimony to the Liberian TRC:  
 
So my mother left my grand ma and and they sit her down by the road. Before we 
could look, he fired her and she fell down and died. My mother wanted to cry and I 
begged her not to cry and they told my ma to laugh or they will kill her too, so she 
had to laugh. I told her to forget and continue walking. We reach certain place my 
father was in front and they did not even call his attention, they just shot behind his 
neck. He dropped and my ma wanted to cry and I told her not to cry because for me 




Marie Konyan constructs herself as both courageous and stoical in her placation of 
her mother who she advises „to forget and continue walking‟, „not to cry‟, and later, 
„lets go‟. Indeed, Njabulo Ndebele speaks of how „people reinvent themselves through 
narrative‟,
164
 but more significantly, people constitute themselves through narrative 
as they teach their listeners who they are and what they are capable of, as is evident 
in the above extract from Marie Konyan‟s testimony. 
 This construction of identity through memory and narrative becomes more 
significant when considering that one of the major sources of conflict of the Liberian 
civil war was the identity struggles many native Liberian‟s faced through the 
degradation of them and their traditions by the Americo-Liberian settlers. The report 
of the Liberian TRC reads: 
 
Another significant historical antecedent to settler and indigenous Liberian conflict 
was the innocuous attempt by settlers to degrade the identity and status of native 
Liberians through a subtle inferiorization process. Not only were native Liberians 
viewed as inferior by many settlers, but the settlers also attempted to erase the 
cultural identity of the natives by surreptitiously coercing them to adopt English 
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names, borne by Americo-Liberians, and by inculcating them into Western 




Therefore, in some ways, the opportunity to testify and narrate their own stories 
empowers the disempowered and giving a voice, quite literally, to those whose 
voices were previously silenced. 
However, traumatic experiences fundamentally effect and change a person‟s 
identity and self. It has been empirically recognized how behaviour and attitude 
change after suffering a traumatic incident as the survivor grapples to deal with and 
accept what has happened to them, and as the memory of the trauma revisits them in 
the form of hallucinations, flashbacks, dreams and changed „thoughts and behaviours 
stemming from the event‟.
166
 Indeed, writing about how soldiers are traumatised by 
war, the psychiatrist Gordon Turnbull explains how many ex-soldiers are among the 
homeless and constitute a significant portion of the prison population, as they are 
unable to readjust to a normal life after the army.
167
 What this demonstrates is the 
extent to which a traumatic experience can change a person‟s identity and life, the 
result often being varying forms of anti-socialness.
168
 Indeed, Turnbull quotes from 
an ex-soldier named only as George who, since suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress 




The consequences are, therefore, considerable for a nation where the vast 
majority of its population will no doubt be suffering from some sort of PTSD as a 
result of the on-going civil war. Indeed, Dr Benjamin Harris in his report to the 
Liberian TRC, after undertaking research on PTSD in Liberia as a result of the civil 
war, concluded that „sixty-five per cent (65%) experienced symptoms of 
psychological distress characterised by sleep difficulties, bad dreams, poor 
concentration, aggression and headaches. About seventy per cent (70%) said they 
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had lost confidence in others.‟
170
 And further, a 2010 report by IRIN News (a 
humanitarian news and analysis service of the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) notes how, 
 
Research by Kirsten Johnson published in 2008 in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, found that 44 per cent of the adult household population had 
symptoms associated with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The difference 





A country‟s economy and societal wellbeing will be severely affected by a 
population of ex-combatants - many of whom were indoctrinated as child soldiers – 
survivors of war, where many will have suffered personal losses to their families, or 
some sort of physical or mental violation themselves. It is vital, then, for the 
country‟s truth commission to look at ways, perhaps more fundamental than 
speaking testimony, to address a traumatised nation suffering severe identity crises.  
Indeed, written in the chapter entitled „Priority Recommendations‟ in the 
Final Report of the Liberian TRC is the concern that the needs of those traumatised 
as a result of the atrocities of the civil war need to be met; the report posits that this 
is to be achieved through actions such as reparations for the victims and addressing 
the impunity of the perpetrators through either legal trials or public naming and 
shaming.
172
 However, these solutions result in a undesirable public and official 
labelling of the victim and the perpetrator which, directly because it is both public 
and official, dooms the pair to be eternally categorized as “victim” or “perpetrator” 
by their society, an identity which - according to labelling theory - they will come to 
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 Furthermore, I spoke earlier about the politics of the trauma, as the 
wounder overpowers the wounded, leaving an eternal mark of their domination; by 
marking out the wounder and the wounded in public society this power relationship 
is continued and augmented through its public acknowledgement. For these reasons, 
this paper is critical of the recommendations made by the Liberian TRC to help those 
traumatised by the country‟s civil war; indeed, their recommendations fail to take 
into account the highly complex, and even political, nature of trauma.     
3.2 Memory and History  
 
Asides from hoping that through testimony-making those who suffered the effects of 
the civil war will be given an opportunity to heal by making sense of their traumas 
through narrative, truth commissions require the stories of individuals to come 
together to create a collective history of the nation that is reflective of the truth of 
their past.
174
 However, considering the majority of these testimonies are traumatic in 
content, the truth commission‟s objective to use them to create an official history is, 
both in theory and practice, flawed. This section will explore the ways in which 
trauma resists time and, therefore, being historicised.  
Trauma is, by definition, outside of time, existing, as Charlotte Delbo calls it, 
in a „perpetual present‟.
175
 Traumatic memories are not memories in any ordinary 
sense; these memories are persistent, invading the present and future with an 
incessant past. For Culbertson, „perhaps it [the memory of the trauma] is not even 
remembered, but only felt as a presence or perhaps it shapes current events according 
to its template itself unrecognized‟.
176
 Note Culbertson‟s tentative language – 
„perhaps‟, „perhaps‟ – demonstrating the rather arcane nature of trauma, where the 
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only sound finding any have really been able to make is that it is unknowable and 
undefined. But more than this, trauma is a-temporal, existing not simply as a past 
memory but in this state of „perpetual present[ness]‟ as it revisits people in „the form 
of repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts or behaviours‟.
177
   
However, the testimonies of trauma can betray the traumatic memory by re-
presenting it within language which is chronological and ordered through the 
structures of grammar. Indeed, Lawrence Langer notes how,  
 
Testimony may appear chronological to the auditor or audience, but the narrator 
who is a mental witness rather than a temporal one is „out of time‟ as she tells her 
story […] Lyotard calls in the retrieval of a time that is lost „because it has not had 
place and time in the psychic apparatus‟. He speaks of a moment „where the present 




For believers in psychiatric therapy, the a-temporal nature of trauma is due to the 
fact that these memories have not yet been processed by what Lyotard (above) calls 
the „psychic apparatus‟.
179
 However, as outlined above, for others these traumas may 
never be able to be processed or understood by the conscious mind as they fall 
outside the range of references with which we come to make sense of and understand 
our experiences. But besides this, the unknowable and ever-enduring nature of 
trauma makes it impossible to historicize as to become history something needs to be 
completed and left neatly in the past. Indeed, Caruth explains this paradoxical link 
between trauma testimony and history: „the traumatized […] carry an impossible 
history within them, or they become themselves the symptoms of a history that they 
cannot entirely possess‟.
180
 Speaking about postcolonial fiction Anne Whitehead 
discusses how the notion of memory itself is incompatible with the sort of objective 
and totalising history which official bodies, such as truth commissions, seek to write; 
she explains how postcolonial fiction „has often sought to replace the public and 
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collective narrative of history with an interior and private act of memory. Memory 
counters or resists the ways in which history elides difference and forgets the 
heterogeneous.‟
181
 It appears, then, that truth commissions are neglectful of the 
reality of trauma in the face of their objectives as it cannot, by its very nature, be laid 
to rest as a past experience as its effects continue to be felt in the present.  
 
4. Communication  
 
As argued above, truth commissions make numerous assumptions about the nature 
of trauma in order to fulfil their objectives of truth, history, reconciliation and 
justice. Besides from assuming that the testimonies of individuals - although many of 
them are traumatic in nature – can be a source of objective knowledge and can be 
used to create an official and national history, truth commissions assume, most 
fundamentally, that experience – whether traumatic or not – can be shared. Indeed, 
the mandate of the Liberian TRC speaks of how it „provide[s] opportunities for them 
[those who have suffered as a result of the civil war] to relate their experiences‟;
182
 
and this notion is furthermore reiterated in the daily functioning of the TRC as 
witnesses are called to „share [their] story‟.
183
 This section will therefore explore 
Wigmore‟s third point in the process of testimony, viz. communication. From a 
phenomenological perspective this section will consider whether experience can be 
shared, notably when the medium of communication is speech and language – here 
in the form of testimony. This section will move on to consider the use of language 
and narrative as a mechanism for healing trauma. This paper argues that although it 
may not be possible to perfectly convey and share the essence of a subjective 
experience, there are important ethical implications in the very act of endeavouring 
to understand the other as a subject. Beyond this, I examine how useful testimony 
really is to the traumatised subject as they continue on with their individual lives, 
arguing that through trauma testimony the individual becomes docile as it is made 
                                                          
181
 Anne Whitehead, Trauma Fiction, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p. 82. 
182
 Supra note 4 at 4.  
183
 TRC of Liberia hearings at Fish Town City, February 25 2008, available at 
http://trcofliberia.org/transcripts/29, last accessed 7
th















vulnerable by reliving the trauma of the past and, in this way, becomes an easily 
mouldable body for the use of the new political order. 
 
4.1 Sharing Experience 
 
Truth commissions advocate for the sharing of personal experiences in order to 
reconcile a country. This simple notion of sharing experience between two people 
has been examined and deconstructed by numerous schools of thought. Stemming 
from Nietzschean thinking, which rejected the Kantian idea that humankind had 
common categories with which to experience the world (and therefore reach a 
common and objective truth), phenomenologists examined the concept of 
experience, and how the subject experiences the phenomena of the world.
184
 For 
these thinkers, humans are individually experiencing subjects whose conscious 
constitutes both itself and the world around it: what Heidegger named “being-in-the-
world”.
185
 Proponents of this school of thought have used the term “qualia” to 
describe subjective sensory experiences.
186
 The question is, then, is my qualia the 
same as yours? Is my experience of an event we both witnessed the same as yours? 
Arguably, no, as although two subjects may both simultaneously witness or 
experience the same happening, their subjective interpretations will differ as their 
social, cultural and personal frames of reference with which their interpretations are 
constituted will never perfectly correlate. Indeed, we interpret an experience by 
comparing it to past experiences which our minds have already understood and 
processed. And furthermore, one‟s culture and society provide interpretive material 
with which to understand experiences. It is for this reason that traumas fail to be 
processed by the conscious mind as they fall outside of our personal and cultural 
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range of referential experiences. Therefore, a testimony, especially one of trauma, 
will fail to be heard by any who have not experienced something very similar.
187
  
Indeed, many have spoken on this problem of witnessing trauma testimony 
and sharing the experience of trauma. Culbertson speaks of how „this wordless 
language is unintelligible to one whose body is not similarly affected, and because 
without words the experience has a certain shadowy quality, a paradoxical 
unreality‟.
188
 Additionally, for Humphrey „listeners can simply fail to comprehend 
traumatic experiences that are beyond their knowledge. Witnessing violence or 
hearing accounts of it encounter a loss of powers of perception and description.‟
189
 
Culbertson writes of a „wordless language‟ and, further, Humphrey speaks here of a 
failure in „description‟; indeed, besides from interpreting experiences differently, 
individuals will bring to the language choices a testimony-maker employs their own 
range of connotations and for this reason, even if the experience was felt in the same 
way by two differing subjects, the difficulty arises when one attempts to share this 
experience through language.  
However, witnessing testimony and hearing accounts of trauma is, to a 
certain extent, culturally relative, as individuals from similar cultural backgrounds 
tend to share – not fully, but partially – a field of reference with which to interpret 
and understand experience. The phenomenologists speak of this as 
“intersubjectivity”, describing when two subjects experience the same phenomena.
190
 
Developing on, this notion of intersubjectivity stands as a foundation for the relation 
between listening or reading and ethics. Indeed, if we accept that two subjects can - 
to an extent - share an experience, or at the very least be conscious of the other 
subject who also experiences, then this becomes the basis for our ethical 
understanding of the other as we begin to empathize with what he/she is 
experiencing. In this case, the sharing of experiences at truth commissions becomes 
an act of ethical engagement as the self becomes conscious of the experiences of the 
other, potentially leading to some sort of reconciliation. 
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However, this requires an understanding of language, the medium by which 
this sharing of experience is communicated, as a field of intersubjectivity. It has been 
often been debated just how far language is intersubjective as the general denotations 
and connotations of words in the same language are similar from person to person.
191
 
Yet, followers of linguistic determinist thought propose that language - besides from 
containing differing connotations for differing people - limits experience.
192
 
Language can only re-present an experience and in this re-presentation many aspects 
of the original experience are both lost and modified. Indeed, have the creators of 
language suffered traumas enough for there to be a language or vocabulary with 
which to speak of trauma? Or, do the survivors of trauma necessarily have to suffer 
in silence because the speaking of such experiences renders them trivial? Although 
truth commissions proffer that through the act of narration and testimony trauma can 
be healed as one makes sense of our lives through its expression in the structures of 
language, is it not the case that the trauma becomes further repressed as it is 
reworked into a medium which limits its reality even further, leading Culbertson to 
claim of trauma that „ordinary narrative is simply inadequate‟.
193
 
And furthermore, post-structuralists contend that the cultural and social 
denotations of language are fostered by certain dominant people for certain ends.
194
 
Therefore, certain, usually dominant, discourses are promulgated by the very 
language choices made in testimony and by the cultural affectations of those 
listening. This viewpoint is incredibly limiting as it suggests that the meaning of all 
we speak, write and hear is predetermined. However, I would like to proffer the 
suggestion that other mediums of expression be used by truth commissions in order 
to encourage a conscientizing of the other so as to foster general healing and 
reconciliation. It is therefore commendable that the Liberian TRC created the TRC‟s 
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Children‟s Art Gallery which showcases the art, poetry and stories of children 




     
4.2 The Politics of Healing Through Testimony 
 
 
The effects of trauma are, arguably, permanent. On both sides of the debate, 
theorists, practitioners and sufferers themselves have avidly argued as to whether one 
can ever recover from trauma. Turnbull‟s ex-militant case-study, George, claims 
timidly, „“I am not sure you ever can become 100% fixed”‟.
196
 Yet, the South 
African TRC – which inspired and greatly influenced the work of the Liberian TRC 
– assumes the belief that through speaking and narrative one can make sense of, and 
eventually over-come, one‟s trauma: this is echoed in their catch-phrase “revealing is 
healing”. 
However, there are a couple of issues that need to be raised here. The first is 
a practical issue concerning the fact that although psychiatrists and psychotherapists 
agree on the importance of drawing out repressed traumas through speech and 
narrative, they also proffer that it takes many sessions for the trauma to be released 
and for some sort of healing to take place. Conversely, at a truth commission, 
testimony-makers are given one opportunity to speak which, arguably, does more 
harm than good as trauma sufferers are made to relive their traumas for the sake of 
the country‟s political peace-making. Indeed, Sarah Nutall speaks of how „many 
were re-traumatized by the process‟ of testimony-making at the South African 
TRC.
197
 In this way, therefore, those who come to testify about their traumas of the 
war are once again made vulnerable to the power of their trauma by re-living it 
through testimony.  
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As explained above, the unconscious mind is deliberate in its repression of 
the traumatic memory for the protection of the self, as to be made conscious of the 
experience of trauma means to re-experience its devastating effects once more. 
Indeed, for Culbertson traumatic memory „is not memory to be told, not memory to 
be analyzed, but memory to be used for the purposes of survival‟.
198
 Moreover, not 
only is it perhaps impossible to heal – if healing is indeed possible at all – through 
the act of speaking in testimony, but traumas are fundamentally physical and bodily 
experiences, which cannot be healed through talking alone. Traumas are felt, known 
and remembered by the body; the body will experience hot sweats, feelings of 
fainting, dizziness and even nervous disorders as the body freezes believing another 
attack in immanent.
199
 Babette Rothschild in her book The Body Remembers: The 
Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment considers the importance of 
somatic memory: the physical memories of the body which can be triggered by touch 
or other sensory phenomena. Rothschild insists on the importance of the body in the 
treatment of trauma as, for her, the body is a significant site where the trauma and 
the effects of trauma are played out: „[w]hen healing trauma, it is crucial to give 
attention to both body and mind; you can‟t have one without the other.‟
200
 Indeed, 
one of the most important techniques or the trauma therapy is, for Rothschild, that 
the survivor feels completely safe in the environment in which the therapy is taking 
place. And further, she encourages the vigilant awareness by the survivor of their 
bodily reactions, fears and emotions as they tackle their PTSD: 
 
So I teach them about self-awareness, body awareness and emotional awareness. I 
get them to be able to evaluate questions like „When we are working in this way do 
I feel more calm? Do I feel more present? Is my life working better? Am I more 
resilient?‟ and so on. If the answer to those questions is primarily „yes‟ then this is 
something that works well. However if they are answering „yes‟ to: „Am I feeling 
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more unstable, more decompensated, more spacey, less productive, having more 




If, then, truth commissions wish to provide a forum where trauma victims can begin 
to heal with effect from their traumas caused by the war or conflict of their nation, 
then it is necessary for these commissions to incorporate some of the more recent 
debates and ideas concerning trauma and somatic memories into their ideologies and 
operations. Without addressing or, at the very least being conscious of, the trauma of 
the body truth commissions can arguably become a place where victims of trauma 
come to be re-traumatised by experiencing their traumas again in a place which 




This section has explored the possibilities and limitations of testimony from both a 
conceptual and philosophical perspective, and a practical one. At truth commission 
individuals are asked to come forward and share their experiences of a nation‟s past 
in the form of testimony. These testimonies are to come together to create shared 
picture of the past, to foster reconciliation, to bring about justice for the victims and 
victimisers of the war, and to help heal those most affected through the act of 
testifying. However, in these objectives truth commissions make numerous 
assumptions about the nature of testimony and trauma. 
 On the one hand, therefore, testifying offers an opportunity for people to 
engage and empathize with the other as the speaker finds language with which to 
connect with the listener, and as the listener becomes conscious of the subjective 
experiences of the speaker. In this way, truth commissions – even more so when a 
kind of dialogue is fostered – encourage reconciliation in the ethics of reading as 
meaning is shared and new meaning created. Indeed, testimony becomes an act of 
political negotiation as the self grapples with the needs of those witnessing and the 
situation, and their own personal need to tell and be heard. Furthermore, through 
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memory and testimony identities are constructed through the privileging of certain 
notions of the self and the suppression of others. Moreover, the individual memories 
in truth commission testimonies are not simply a source of truth and knowledge 
about the past, but a place whereby the past is constituted and given meaning.  
However, on the other hand, traumatic experiences resist knowledge, 
recollection and communication, the tripartite steps of testimony, according to 
Wigmore. Indeed, trauma resists knowledge as traumas are, by definition, those 
happenings which the human mind cannot register as they fall outside of the usual 
frame of reference with which we interpret experience. Secondly, traumas do not 
conform to the typical memory form in that they refuse to be laid to rest in the past. 
Traumas are effectively a-temporal as they cannot be ordered in any distinctly 
chronological manner, and for this reason, they refuse, against the objectives of truth 
commissions, to be historicised. Furthermore, traumatic memories are not memories 
as such as they are, purposefully, repressed by the unconscious mind as a survival 
instinct so the body and mind does not have to continuously relive the pains of that 
trauma. In this way, the demand by truth commissions for individuals to retell, and 
therefore relive, their traumas for the good of national healing, in fact re-
subjectivises these people to their traumas, making them docile bodies for the new 
political regime to manipulate.  
And lastly, this paper has considered phenomenological thought in order to 
address the question of whether experience, especially traumatic experience, can 
ever be shared and communicated. Because of the essentially unknowable nature of 
trauma, traumatic experiences are difficult to understand both for the survivor and 
for those who attempt to listen to these testimonies. But beyond this, it is the body 
that needs to communicate the experience, not just the mind, as the body too 
experiences and suffers the trauma. Indeed, when Amelia Dimsea comes to the 
Liberian TRC hearings she cannot speak of her trauma, instead her bodies 
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„In a kind of collective failure of imagination, we learned that we simply could 
not think our way out of our pasts.‟ 
                     „It is possible to create past events simply by saying they occurred.‟ 
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Undoubtedly the work of truth commissions around the world has not been in vain. 
Thousands have felt the effects of their efforts to restore a country to peace and 
order, yet many others are left untouched. However, there are issues within the 
conceptual framework of a truth commission that I have felt necessary to explore 
here in this paper.  
 Indeed, truth commissions stand as an institutional technology that ushers in 
the new government. This paper has been cognisant of the political purposes of truth 
commissions when deconstructing some of the conceptual elements of their make-
up. The limitations of the construction of truth by a truth commission have been 
evaluated. This paper has deconstructed the understanding of truth by truth 
commissions as an objective reality to be found in factual and corroborative 
evidence, suggesting that this conceptualisation of truth, and the prioritising of this 
kind of truth, subscribes to the promulgation of certain dominant discourses, namely, 
the discourses of science and law. These dominant discourses - along with the new 
discourse of truth and reconciliation constructed by a truth commission - work to 
subjectivise individuals, making their mind and bodies docile sites for the realisation 
of the political and economic goals of the new government. Indeed, this paper has 
proffered that truth commissions are institutional tools of the hegemonic ideals of 
Western democracy which ensures the success of the new and democratic 
government through the discrediting of the old order and through its truth-claiming 
meta-narratives.  
 However, on the other hand, I have argued here as to the importance of the 
creative act of testimony for the creation of subjective truths. The personal and 
subjective truths of those who creatively participate in speech and language in order 
to share their experiences of the war become a site for the ethical engagement of the 
self and the other, as the speaker empathizes with its audience through its language 
choices and narrative constructions, and as those listening identify in their testimony. 
Indeed, these individual stories lie in comparison to the official “history” produced 
by truth commissions which claims to be truth which cannot be judged. In this way a 
truth commission becomes like the theatre houses of Greek tragedies which, for 

















 Indeed, I argue that through the ethics of narrative, some sort of 
reconciliation can be achieved as new meanings are created.  
 Having laid out the value of testimony in chapter one, the second chapter 
moved on to deconstruct the notion of testimony, both conceptually and as it is 
performed at truth commissions. I have presented the difficulties of testifying when 
the content of the testimony is a traumatic experience, explaining how traumas are 
fundamentally known, felt and remembered by the body, rather than the conscious 
mind. Indeed, how can a truth commission, which understands truth as knowledge, 
expect to find this truth in the testimonies of the traumatised, as the testimonies of 
trauma do not convey knowledge of an event but rather a kind of re-living of 
experience? I have therefore highlighted in this paper the importance of 
understanding the difficult and volatile nature of trauma, as those testifying about 
traumatic events can - arguably - be re-traumatised by re-living their experience in 
testimony. Furthermore, I have posited the notion that in trauma there is a power 
relation, a desire by the victimiser to dominant over and hold knowledge of the 
victim; the resulting trauma, then, becomes like a Foucauldian discourse which 
continues to subjugate the self internally. For this reason I have proffered that truth 
commissions make vulnerable, once more, the citizens of the country of inquiry as 
they are subjugated again to the power of their trauma. 
Sadly, Prince Yormie Johnson, one of the worst perpetrators of violence and 
brutality during the Liberian civil war, is now running as a presidential candidate in 
the upcoming October 2011 elections. The Liberian TRC painted Prince Johnson as 
the ultimate violator, the epitome of the harsh and gruesome nature of the civil 
war.
205
 Now, as this man stands for public office, it is thought that he will be voted 
for not out of admiration for his values and respect for his campaign, but out of fear 
from knowing what he has, in the past, been capable of.
206
 Indeed, this surely 
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demonstrates the enduring political power the traumatiser continues to wield over 
those he has wounded. And further, it is questionable to what extent the Liberian 
TRC itself, in making public the atrocities committed by Prince Johnson, has helped 
his rise to power.  
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